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1275 
JUDGE HARRY EDWARDS: A CASE IN POINT! 
KEVIN M. CLERMONT* 
THEODORE EISENBERG** 
Judge Harry Edwards dislikes empirical work that is not flattering to 
federal appellate judges. A few years ago Dean Richard Revesz published 
an empirical study of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit providing further support for the rather tame proposition that 
judges’ political orientation has some effect on outcome in some 
politically charged cases.1 A year later Judge Edwards published a 
criticism phrased in extreme terms.2 Dean Revesz then wrote a devastating 
reply by which he demonstrated that Judge Edwards “is simply wrong 
with respect to each of the numerous criticisms that he levels.”3 
We believe that Judge Edwards, when he commented on our 
presentation at a recent conference,4 preserved his batting average. Giving 
 
 
 * Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University. We would like to thank for their valuable 
input Michael Heise, Bob Hillman, Niki Kuckes, Jeff Rachlinski, and Emily Sherwin. 
 ** Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell University. 
 1. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1717 (1997). 
 2. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 
1335 (1998). Judge Edwards had earlier expressed his disdain for legal scholarship that did not meet 
his definition of “practical” research—namely, scholarship that proves useful to judges and lawyers by 
being prescriptive and doctrinal. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). For a rebuttal, see, e.g., Jack M. 
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles of Law Professors in 
the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173, 176-77 (2001); Richard A. Posner, The 
Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993) (part of 
symposium). For Judge Edwards’ surrebuttal, see Harry T. Edwards, Another “Postscript” to “The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,” 69 WASH. L. REV. 561, 
567 (1994) (“I have been mostly amused by the critical articles (such as Judge Posner’s) appearing in 
the Symposium edition of the Michigan Law Review.”). The realm of his disdain must have expanded, 
because the article by Dean Revesz was eminently practical. 
 In fact, Judge Edwards does not seem opposed to empirical research that is not critical of federal 
judges. He himself took a stab at empirical work in Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions 
Concerning the “Politics” of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 619 (1985). And when criticizing Lawrence M. Friedman, Judging the Judges: Some Remarks on 
the Way Judges Think and the Way Judges Do, at http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Conf2001/ 
washuconf.htm, Judge Edwards added an attack on Professor Friedman’s lack of an empirical premise 
for questioning the objectivity of federal judges. See Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Norms: A Judge’s 
Perspectives, at http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Conf2001/Edwards.html. 
 3. Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge 
Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805, 805 (1999) (emphasis in original); see id. at 849-50 
(characterizing Judge Edwards’ “inflammatory style” as “strident and tendentious rhetoric”). 
 4. Institute for Law and Economic Policy Conference on Litigation in a Free Society at 
Hollywood, Fla. (Mar. 15, 2002). Unfortunately, the tape of our conference session went missing. See 
e-mail from Laura Stein, Special Counsel, ILEP, to Kevin M. Clermont (June 14, 2002) (on file with 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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no forewarning and employing an unjudicial tone, he lambasted a single 
paragraph of our thirty-five page paper,5 a paragraph to which we had not 
so much as alluded in our oral presentation. That paragraph just happened 
to have summarized a series of our earlier articles6 that had raised some 
doubts about the evenhandedness of federal appellate courts’ treatments of 
plaintiffs and defendants. Even after delivering his oral comments, he 
refused to let us see the written version prepared by him and his co-author. 
He then used his considerable influence to persuade the law review against 
publishing in the symposium issue any form of reply whatsoever to his 
oral or written comments.  
Now, upon its publication, we have finally been able to read his written 
remarks.7 Suffice it to say, his Article exhibits none of the virtues or 
benefits that would have flowed from open discourse. And the tone, 
although turned down several notches, remains disturbing. We sadly 
realize that authors who reply to an attack never distinguish themselves 
unless they take the very high road. But that road looks steep when the 
attack goes to such extremes. Still, we shall try here at least to restrict our 
response to his principal line of argument. Respond to that argument we 
must, because allowing it to stand would undermine not only our appellate 
research but also much of current empirical work on the law. 
I. SPECULATION AND COUNTERSPECULATION 
To focus the debate, the premise for our notorious paragraph was the 
direct observation in federal civil cases “that defendants succeed more 
than plaintiffs on appeal. For example, defendants appealing their losses 
after trial obtain reversals at a 33% rate, while losing plaintiffs succeed in 
only 12% of their appeals from trials.”8 We had obtained this result from a 
database that we had created from data of the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts on all federal appeals from fiscal year 1988 through fiscal 
 
 
authors). 
 5. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 
153 (2002) [hereinafter Litigation Realities]. 
 6. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ 
Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125 (2001) [hereinafter Defendant/Plaintiff I]; Kevin M. Clermont 
& Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 
(2000) [hereinafter Defendant/Plaintiff II]; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia 
in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming) (page proofs on file with authors) [hereinafter Defendant/Plaintiff III]. 
 7. Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of Judicial 
Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002). 
 8. Litigation Realities, supra note 5, at 153. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/4
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year 1997. 
Judge Edwards does not question these reversal-rate statistics showing 
an antiplaintiff effect—indeed, he expresses the surprising (and somewhat 
atypical9) reaction that he finds these asymmetrical results completely 
unsurprising.10 What he chooses to attack instead is our subsequent 
speculation that appellate courts seem to be favoring the defendant, 
perhaps because like the rest of society they view the trial courts as being 
proplaintiff, or perhaps because their distance from the particular case’s 
facts inclines them to discount harms to the plaintiff. Our thought was that 
sometimes appellate judges, though richly experienced even at trial work, 
can look at a case that they did not hear at trial and tend to see an 
undeserving plaintiff, thus creating a marginal effect that advantages 
defendants.11 Our series of earlier articles had marshaled various kinds of 
indirect proof, both statistical and psychological but which we shall not 
rehearse here, in support of this speculation regarding appellate judges’ 
being human and so probably having misperceptions or biases.12 
Again, he does not really challenge the validity of our indirect proof—
besides bristling at the use of the word “bias,” which we used only in its 
 
 
 9. Most people find the results noteworthy. In addition to many online downloads and e-mail 
inquiries, a sign of this reaction was the relatively strong media interest in our appellate studies. See, 
e.g., Jess Bravin, U.S. Courts Are Tough on Job-Bias Suits, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2001, at A2; Gail 
Diane Cox, Those Appealing Defendants, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 14, 2002, at A22; Jerry Crimmins, U.S. 
Appeals Courts Tilt Toward Defendants in Civil Cases: Study, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 6, 2002, at 
1; Reynolds Holding, Good News and Bad News in Appeals Court Rulings, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 
2001, at WB4; Susan Mandel, Equal Treatment?, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2001, at 24; Thomas Scarlett, 
Federal Appellate Courts Tilt Toward Defendants, Study Finds, TRIAL, Mar. 2002, at 17. 
 10. See Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 724, 728, 732. But see id. at 732 n.35 (contradicting 
himself). 
 11. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 141-45; Defendant/Plaintiff II, supra note 6, at 
132-34; Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 107-08; cf. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, 
Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565 
(2001) (showing that district judges sitting by designation act differently from appellate judges, by 
acting more diffidently and more neutrally); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes 
Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1989) (showing that vantage point 
affects the observer’s impressions, with emphasis on the differences between district and appellate 
judges). 
 12. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 146-55; Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 
108-22. Our statement that federal appellate judges “remain human after all,” Defendant/Plaintiff I, 
supra, at 142, seemed to set Judge Edwards off, see Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 731, 733. 
Indeed, he apparently considered it “worse,” id. at 731, than our “worst” mistake, id. at 729. 
 Similarly, our mild observation that federal appellate judges operate routinely “without any 
check” by review from above, Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 142, generated this response to 
our “cynical” and “self-serving” assertion: “[T]he essence of appellate judging is the principled 
application of legal rules. . . . Judges with whom we are familiar work very hard to apply the law, not 
personal biases, and they are ‘checked’ by the law, their oath of office, judicial codes of conduct, and 
one another.” Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 731. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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social-science sense of an inclination off the merits that might even be 
unconscious but is systematic, without any of the popular connotation of 
an invidious intention to prejudice.13 What he instead targets specifically is 
the propriety of speculating at all when any alternative explanation of the 
data possibly exists.14 If an alternative explanation exists, he insists, one 
cannot rely on quantitative data but must instead resort to in-depth 
consideration of the qualitative context of each of the thousands of datum 
points. By “flawed reasoning” we failed to perceive the alternative 
explanation, and our “deficient empirical research” then relied on 
conclusory numbers rather than on full cases.15 
To destroy our speculation, he maintains that everyone who knows 
anything about the legal system—especially his fellow appellate judges 
but notably not us—knows that plaintiffs appeal on the facts (a sure way to 
fail), while defendants appeal on the law (a good-percentage bet, 
according to Judge Edwards’ oral comments, because district courts often 
wing it by leaving the law to appellate courts).16 To his mind, he thereby 
provides an alternative explanation of our data that condemns, by its very 
existence, our speculation on favoritism. 
Yet consider what his counterspeculation implies. After trial, the losing 
plaintiff or defendant may push one or more points on appeal. If the loser 
succeeds on any of these points, the court of appeals will normally reverse. 
Now, Judge Edwards is maintaining that the plaintiffs’ lawyers comb the 
records and come up mainly with factual errors, which of course meet a 
 
 
 13. In opening and closing his Article, Judge Edwards claims that we accused federal appellate 
judges of an “unprincipled bias.” Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 723, 734. We in fact never used 
that term. Indeed, his accusation raises the question of what would be a “principled bias.” At the least, 
as we shall try to show, the rest of his article provides multiple examples of biased principles. See infra 
text accompanying note 47. 
 14. See id. at 728-29. 
 15. See id. at 723. 
 16. See id. at 724, 728, 730 & tbl.2. He states this alternative explanation repeatedly: 
In particular, we would hypothesize that appeals brought by defendants more often involve 
viable legal issues than appeals by plaintiffs. Legal, not factual, issues are the principal work 
of the appellate courts, so if one group of litigants presents more viable legal claims than 
another, they will win reversals at a higher rate. 
Id. at 724. 
In our experience, defendant/appellants rarely challenge findings of fact. In contrast, our 
sense is that plaintiff/appellants, who almost always carry the burden of proof at trial, are 
more often forced to rely on what are essentially factual claims, although they may, at times, 
be artfully clothed as “legal error.” If we are right, defendants are likely to have a predictable 
advantage on appeal. Why? Because trial courts are owed great deference in their findings of 
fact, whereas viable legal arguments mandate de novo review and so are much more likely to 
capture the attention of appellate judges. 
Id. at 728. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/4
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deferential standard of review and hence tend to fail. But the defendants’ 
lawyers are bright enough to pick legal errors that get de novo review. 
Note that he is not saying that legal errors do not exist for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to pick—that would require him to claim that the district courts 
are showing an antidefendant bias, for which he has absolutely no proof 
and on which contrary proof actually exists.17 He is instead saying that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys consistently overlook the legal errors against their 
interest. Those plaintiffs’ attorneys thereby throw away money (often the 
attorneys’ own money) in case after case, year after year, never learning 
from their folly. In short, he implies that defendants’ lawyers are 
competent, while plaintiffs’ lawyers are incompetent. 
Judge Edwards’ position could be true to some extent. Being true to an 
extent that would be broad enough to explain the large antiplaintiff effect, 
however, is a tall and unfilled order. As we shall show in the next two 
sections, his position not only proves implausible as even a partial 
explanation but also reveals something telling about the attitudes of one 
appellate judge. 
II. REFUTATION OF COUNTERSPECULATION 
A. Indirect Refutation 
In the series of earlier articles on appeal, we had considered a whole set 
of alternative explanations of the antiplaintiff effect in order to provide 
additional indirect proof of our speculation. In particular, we considered 
plaintiff/defendant competence differentials, rejecting them by sifting 
through our data and by referring to other empirical work.18 Prominent 
among our points was that these “incompetent” plaintiffs’ lawyers had 
managed to survive the pretrial dangers and then to achieve a 54% trial 
win rate.19 In brief, no substantial explanatory role as to the antiplaintiff 
effect on appeal seems to exist for a difference in competence between the 
two sides’ lawyers.  
In a draft of the first in that series of articles, we also discussed the 
 
 
 17. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Why Do Juries Get a Bum Rap? Reflections on the Work of 
Valerie Hans, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 454-55 (1998); Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the 
Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found in the Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 229-30 (1998); Neil 
Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 
849, 868-71 (1998). 
 18. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 148-49; Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 
108-09. 
 19. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 149. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1275 Clermont book pages.doc3/10/2003   5:35 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1280 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:1275 
 
 
 
 
possibility of plaintiffs being more factual in orientation than defendants. 
But after further exploring the data, we dropped that line of argument as 
being implausible.20 In the articles as published, then, we did not expressly 
rebut Judge Edwards’ factual/legal twist. But now that he has so strongly 
pressed it, do plaintiffs’ lawyers massively appeal the unreviewable? 
The data did not suggest any such behavior of plaintiffs’ appealing the 
facts and defendants’ appealing the law. Plaintiffs and defendants appeal 
at about the same rate, although his view might predict more appeals by 
plaintiffs because they could always notice factual errors, or at the least his 
view would predict different rates of appeal for such differently motivated 
parties.21 The antiplaintiff effect shows up in appeals from pretrial rulings 
as well as from trial judgments,22 although most pretrial rulings do not 
involve factual findings at all. Moreover, the antiplaintiff effect shows up 
in all the different kinds of case categories23 and for both corporate and 
individual parties,24 although competence differentials would presumably 
vary across these distinctions. 
An indirect way to prove a speculation is to rebut the best 
alternatives.25 A way to uncover the best alternatives is to let vigorous 
adversaries take their best shot. If this factual/legal theory is the best that 
the opposition has to offer, our favoritism speculation on the antiplaintiff 
effect becomes much more convincing. 
 
 
 20. We also pondered a related but cleverer explanation: perhaps defendants after trial are 
appealing pretrial rulings more than plaintiffs do, and hence are appealing law more than fact. Cf. Paul 
W. Mollica, Employment Discrimination Cases in the Seventh Circuit, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 63, 72 (1997) (using this argument to explain rates of appeal). This explanation too is 
unconvincing. Plaintiffs also have some pretrial rulings to complain about after trial, and they do 
actually appeal from legal rulings made during trial; as shown below, their appeals are at least equally 
legal in nature. See infra text accompanying notes 26-37. Indeed, examining a sample of legal appeals 
by defendants after trial, as described below, reveals that only three of eleven such appeals turned in 
part on pretrial rulings (and one of those three ended in affirmance). 
 Moreover, this pretrial/trial twist does not explain the observed patterns in the data as well as our 
attitudinal explanation did. First, the antiplaintiff effect shows up in immediate appeals from pretrial 
rulings as well as in appeals from trial judgments. See infra text accompanying note 22. Second, the 
antiplaintiff effect is at its greatest in cases that fit the format of little victim versus big defendant and 
in cases tried by a jury. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 138-41; Defendant/Plaintiff III, 
supra note 6, at 106-07, 109-11. The pretrial/trial twist—the explanation that defendants are appealing 
pretrial rulings while plaintiffs are stuck with only trial rulings—would not predict these patterns. 
 21. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 134-35; Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 
105-06. 
 22. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 153-55; Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 
117-19. 
 23. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 149. 
 24. See Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 109. 
 25. See Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 724 (“‘[I]n empirical research, challenging a theory 
with the best possible opposing arguments is what makes the strongest case for a theory.’”) (quoting 
Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/4
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B. Direct Refutation 
Logic is not the only weapon against the factual/legal theory. Data 
wound as well.  
We can now provide new data directly applicable to that theory, and 
they are data of the sort Judge Edwards prefers. He accused us of 
irresponsibility in speculating on the meaning of our numerical data 
without systematically reading the thousands and thousands of appellate 
opinions, briefs, and records that supposedly explain our datum points.26 
Yet he apparently felt no obligation to read systematically even his own 
opinions before engaging in counterspeculation.27 Nevertheless, on very 
short order in the vain hope of being permitted to make a 
contemporaneous reply, we did his work for him. 
To get a quick idea of the case flow that is shaping Judge Edwards’ 
view of the legal world, we immediately performed a rough Westlaw28 
search for appeals heard by him from 1987 to now, in job discrimination–
type cases appealed after apparently completed trial. This process 
produced a sample comparable to our trial-appeal database in a common 
type of case that typically shows a strong antiplaintiff effect.29 Twenty-one 
cases showed up, eight of which were plaintiffs’ appeals and thirteen of 
which were defendants’ appeals. In this small sample, the plaintiffs 
obtained reversals at a 38% rate, while the defendants achieved an 
incredible 85% reversal rate. So far, the results fit the pattern we usually 
observe by showing a stark antiplaintiff effect, albeit with rates skewed 
toward reversal.30 Now, as to arguably factual appeals,31 three of the eight 
 
 
 26. See Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 729-31. 
 27.  
 The authors’ failure to consider this possibility is particularly puzzling given the ease with 
which it can be empirically tested. Briefs and opinions (both “published” and “unpublished”) 
furnish a readily available bank of information that can be coded and analyzed to determine the 
degree to which defendants rely on legal claims and plaintiffs rely on factual arguments, as well as 
the degree to which each controlled in the rendering of particular decisions.  
Id. at 730. We note that another researcher who observed the antiplaintiff effect on appeal has actually 
proceeded to do the kind of coding that Judge Edwards calls for; it turned out to involve a lot of work, 
and it confirmed the earlier observation. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001) (confirming, by an in-depth consideration of ADA 
employment discrimination opinions on Westlaw, the antiplaintiff effect on appeal that the author had 
earlier reported from bare outcome data). Incidentally, her research revealed that factual appeals are 
rare. Id. at 244. 
 28. Since 1988, Westlaw has included the D.C. Circuit’s published and unpublished dispositions 
in full text. See Revesz, Ideology, supra note 3, at 809-12. 
 29. See Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 109-11 (showing, for the jobs case category 
nationwide, plaintiff and defendant reversal rates of 6% and 44% respectively). 
 30. The analogous plaintiff and defendant reversal rates for the jobs case category in the D.C. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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plaintiffs’ appeals were of that nature (38%), and only one of the three 
succeeded. However, nine of the thirteen defendants’ appeals were 
arguably factual (69%), and seven of the nine succeeded. While not 
rigorous, these results clearly lend no support to a view that plaintiffs 
appeal the facts while defendants appeal the law. Nor do the results 
support even a view that factually oriented appeals tend to be losers. 
Maybe a specific case from the sample would give more of a flavor 
while also acknowledging Judge Edwards’ demand that we supplement 
quantitative methodologies with close, contextual reading of cases. Palmer 
v. Barry32 is one interesting case that Westlaw turned up, and which we 
classified as a successful defendant’s appeal on legal grounds. Palmer was 
a white firefighter who had brought a Title VII action against officials in 
the District of Columbia for racial discrimination in failing to promote 
him. A two-day bench trial awarded relief to the plaintiff. The defendants 
appealed. The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Edwards, looked hard 
 
 
Circuit as a whole, specially computed from Administrative Office data for the comparable time period 
of fiscal years 1988-2000, were 2% and 67% respectively. 
 31. This coding of opinions was, by necessity, disturbingly subjective. The questions on appeal 
were almost all largely legal in some technical sense, not too surprisingly. Parties in fact do not appeal 
on the ground, say, that the jury got it wrong on the facts. Represented parties are capable of phrasing 
their points as legal errors. Accordingly, what we tried to do was distinguish between factually loaded 
appeals and more purely legal appeals, an impressionistic distinction that correlates with the one 
between deferential and nondeferential standards of review. 
 Moreover, clearly one would have to study also the appellants’ briefs to see the grounds of appeal. 
The appellate opinions are, of course, a filtered account, and often a very abbreviated account at that. 
 The optimist might see the multiple biases in this sort of research as canceling each other out. But 
the realist would counter that, at the least, these biases are not fanciful, citing the nice example of 
Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Edwards, Silberman & D. Ginsburg, JJ.). 
 The Barnes case involved a challenge to discharge from a federal civil service position with the 
Military Traffic Management Command. The appellate court’s description of the case and its 
reasoning were sufficiently factual to cause us to classify it for the text above as an unsuccessful 
plaintiff’s appeal on arguably factual grounds. But a look at the summary of argument in the 
Appellant’s Brief at 9 gave us pause: “Appellant was unlawfully removed because his conduct in 
writing six [supposedly defamatory] letters to the MTMC Commander—which is the sole basis of his 
removal—is protected under various laws, the governing collective bargaining agreement between the 
union and MTMC, and the First Amendment.” The appellees’ brief did its best to rephrase Thomas 
Barnes’ appeal as a factual one, although it also forwarded a jurisdictional argument. His reply brief 
insisted on the legal grounds. After reading the briefs, we reread the court’s opinion and realized that 
perhaps we should have classified this appeal as a legal one. Nevertheless, we did not reclassify it 
because we were not systematically considering the parties’ briefs in this way. 
 The point of the Barnes example is that the coding of any appeal as factual is rather suspect. 
Moreover, the appellate court’s opinion is not necessarily a reliable indicator of the factual nature of 
the appeal. 
 32. 894 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1990), on remand, 794 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1992), aff’d sub nom. 
Palmer v. Kelly, 17 F.3d 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Because the case later reappeared in the court of 
appeals, we had dropped this first appeal from our trial-appeal database. Indeed, such reasons, as well 
as the constraints of Westlaw searching and the different time periods studied, produced only a modest 
overlap between our Westlaw and Administrative Office samples of Judge Edwards’ cases. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/4
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at the facts before concluding that the trial judge had seemed to focus on 
obvious discrimination early in the period under scrutiny and so perhaps 
the plaintiff’s EEOC filing had come too late to be timely. The court 
reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court found again for the 
plaintiff, and a different panel of D.C. judges finally affirmed. The power 
of the Palmer example lies in that Judge Edwards seemed quite ready to 
dive into the facts on behalf of the defendants, in order to reverse the 
plaintiff’s rightful victory below.33 
To get a more systematic understanding, we next looked at all 
categories of cases, not just job cases in which the appellate opinion was 
expansive enough to use the chosen Westlaw search terms. For this, we 
turned to our trial-appeal database, compiled from Administrative Office 
data and used in our earlier articles. We considered only tried cases with a 
judgment below for either plaintiff or defendant and with a decisive 
outcome on appeal, and Westlaw enabled us to narrow the data to those 
appeals heard by Judge Edwards.34 Thirty-seven cases showed up, of 
which twelve remarkably were from the case category of jobs.35  
 Number Reversals Reversal Rate 
plaintiff appeals 25 6 24% 
—“factual” B appeals 16 5 31% 
defendant appeals 12 6 50% 
—“factual” ) appeals 4 2 50% 
 
 
 
 33. There is nothing unique about Palmer. An equivalent point could be made with other cases in 
the sample. E.g., Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Edwards, C.J. & 
Silberman & D. Ginsburg, JJ.) (reversing a similar discrimination judgment on the defendants’ 
factually oriented appeal after bench trial, because the appellate court considered the evidence 
insufficient to prove the plaintiff’s case). 
 34. Judge-specific research is fairly difficult, requiring this resort to Westlaw, because of the 
restrictions on access to the government’s federal court data. The government excises the presiding 
judges’ identities from the data given to the public. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Research 
Access to Federal Court Data, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2161 (2002). 
 35. The jobs case category dominated the appellate docket for the whole D.C. Circuit, accounting 
for 39% of its docket in our trial-appeal database. The oddities of the D.C. docket help to explain our 
early result—of which Judge Edwards makes much, see Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 727—that 
the D.C. Circuit did not exhibit the usual prodefendant pattern. See Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, 
at 142 n.32. When we expanded our study from tort and contract categories to all case categories, the 
prodefendant pattern came to prevail in the D.C. Circuit. See Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 
107. Although we gave Judge Edwards access to that later and bigger study, he chose to ignore it. 
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What do the results, tabulated above, mean? All observers should agree 
that they show the factual/legal theory faltering. But perhaps for some 
observers a first glance might hint that Judge Edwards’ theory retains 
some small bite. We must admit that as we read these thirty-seven 
decisions, we felt we were seeing multiple dispositions that suggested 
weak factual appeals by plaintiffs. Looking a little more closely, however, 
revealed that the effect stemmed from this sample’s many cases in the jobs 
category. In these particular jobs cases (which were minor cases that failed 
to produce an opinion that showed up in the Westlaw search), the plaintiff 
was invariably the appellant; at least in the appellate court’s view, the 
plaintiff never appealed on legal grounds in this fact-intensive sort of case; 
and the plaintiff always met affirmance via a short per curiam burial. 
Subtracting these jobs cases from the sixteen plaintiffs’ appeals that 
verifiably were factually oriented36 leaves only seven nonjobs appeals. 
Amazingly, five of these seven achieved reversals, meaning that they were 
appeals of good quality. Closer examination thus reveals that, other than 
for certain jobs cases, plaintiffs’ appeals on the facts are comparatively 
neither common nor frivolous. 
In sum, we can say that Judge Edwards is operating under a 
misperception that generally plaintiffs appeal the facts while defendants 
appeal the law. We can speculate that his court’s heavy exposure to jobs 
cases has inordinately shaped this mistaken view of the legal world. 
Regardless of cause, appellate misperceptions exist, and they may affect 
appellate outcomes. 
C. Alternative Counterspeculation 
Judge Edwards’ perception that generally plaintiffs appeal the facts 
while defendants appeal the law is so wrong that its refutation implies the 
opposite theory: maybe, in general, defendants appeal the facts while 
plaintiffs appeal the law. At least this theory has the merit of being 
plausible. Suppose plaintiffs are flooding the courts with weak cases that 
nevertheless make it to trial, so that losing defendants will often be 
arguing on appeal that the trial court should have knocked the plaintiff out 
 
 
 36. The appellate court did not state the grounds of appeal in summarily affirming six of the 
plaintiffs’ appeals from the earlier years, and three of the six were jobs cases. Possibly, albeit not 
verifiably from the court’s short opinions, these ambiguous appeals were factually oriented. However, 
we know that not all of them were factual. Our library held the appellate briefs in one of these six 
minor cases, Huntley v. Hartford, 888 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Although James 
Huntley acted pro se in this insurance contract case, he certainly managed to formulate his grounds for 
appeal as legal questions. 
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for insufficient evidence, while any losing plaintiffs are stuck with 
forsaking their weak facts and having to argue the law. Because the cases 
are so weak, the losing defendants’ factual arguments are easier to make 
than the losing plaintiffs’ legal arguments, and so we consequently see 
defendants faring better than plaintiffs on appeal. 
The above-discussed two sets of cases drawn from Westlaw and 
Administrative Office data lend some support to this alternative 
conjecture. Among those opinions, we can examine the relatively 
numerous factual appeals by defendants to see how many were based on 
insufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence. First, as we already recounted, 
nine of the thirteen defendants’ appeals in job discrimination–type cases 
were factual, and seven of the nine succeeded. Of the nine, seven appeals 
were for insufficient evidence, and five of these seven succeeded. Second, 
only four of the twelve defendants’ appeals in nonjobs cases were factual, 
but two of the four succeeded. Of the four, one appeal was for insufficient 
evidence, and it succeeded in that civil rights case. Thus, it appears that at 
least in discrimination cases, defendants on appeal are actually enjoying 
considerable success in arguing insufficient evidence.  
This observation establishes the alternative conjecture as worth 
pondering. But the more questionable step in the conjecture is the 
contention that the defendants’ factual appeals are easier to win than the 
plaintiffs’ legal appeals. It seems odd that defendants should have an 
easier time when invoking a deferential standard of review than plaintiffs 
manage with de novo review: defendants are supposedly finding it easy to 
overturn plaintiffs’ victories after trial on the ground that the case should 
never have gone to the jury or was insufficiently proved to the judge; that 
is, defendants are supposedly often getting the appellate courts to hold that 
the jury verdict was irrational or that the trial judge’s findings were clearly 
erroneous.37 As we say, it seems odd that defendants could develop such a 
stark difference of outlook between trial and appellate courts and exploit it 
often enough to create the lopsided defendants’ appellate advantage that 
we have found in the data. 
Imagine nonetheless that this alternative conjecture is true. It would 
then appear more consistent with our speculation than inconsistent. Such a 
stark difference of outlook between trial and appellate courts would be the 
kind of difference that we are supposing. Clearly, appellate courts being so 
activist in supervising the facts for the defendants’ benefit must think that 
 
 
 37. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 769-75 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining standards of review). 
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the trial courts have lost their way and that they need to intercede against 
too many plaintiffs’ victories. And the motivating preconception that 
plaintiffs’ cases are especially weak—apparently a preconception more 
strongly held by the appellate courts than by the trial courts—would be 
just the sort of appellate attitude that fueled our speculation in the first 
place. 
III. RIGHT AND DUTY TO SPECULATE ABOUT DATA 
In writing our appellate articles, we had not felt that we had to do 
systematic opinion-reading research in order to rebut in advance an 
implausible counterspeculation such as Judge Edwards’. After his oral 
presentation at the ILEP Conference, during the panel discussion, he 
abandoned his refrain of argumentum ad ignorantiam38 to make a new and 
astonishing argument. He asked us to imagine that someone had 
empirically observed that over the years we had given consistently lower 
grades to overweight students—how would we feel if the observer, 
without actually reading exam papers and the like, then suggested that bias 
might be at play? Assuming the response to be obvious, he argued that 
therefore no one should speculate about bias merely by looking at a string 
of decisions. However, we rejected the assumed response, saying that the 
observer’s suggestion about our grading, if based on sound statistics of 
disparate impact, would be entirely proper to express. Such impact on the 
overweight should indeed be a cause for concern, one that justifies 
revelation by the observer and that invites a nondiscriminatory explanation 
from us. Thus, rather than cornering us, his attempt at reductio ad 
absurdum proved to us the propriety of our speculating. 
The motive behind statistical analysis of case outcomes is to enable 
seeing patterns invisible to those who study appellate opinions. Opinions 
may look unassailable when read one-by-one, but overall patterns of data 
may reveal judicial decisionmakers’ systemic attitudes, misperceptions, or 
biases—which, after all, can be seriously pernicious. That is, opinion-
reading and data-mining can reveal different things, and both are 
independently worth doing.39 
 
 
 38. See IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 76 (4th ed. 1972) (defining this fallacy to 
exist “whenever it is argued that a proposition is true simply on the basis that it has not been proven 
false, or that it is false because it has not been proven true”); cf. id. at 74-76 (describing argumentum 
ad hominem). 
 39. For a fuller defense of this kind of research on judicial decisions, see Revesz, Ideology, supra 
note 3, at 844-49, 850-51; id. at 848 (“By exposing what may be unconscious biases, such studies may 
have the effect of narrowing the apparent gap between judges’ perceptions of how they carry out their 
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Once patterns emerge from the data, a researcher can study opinions, 
case files, and other sources to test alternative explanations for which the 
data failed to provide the necessary codes. Yet practicality demands that 
before doing so, the researcher have a plausible theory in mind, such as 
that defendants appeal on the law and plaintiffs appeal on the facts. The 
researcher can form such a theory informally by drawing on a career-long 
project of reading cases, and then dip systematically into the primary 
sources to learn if the theory holds true. In our statistical research project, 
we have indeed engaged in such a process all along, but so far this process 
has uncovered no better explanation of the antiplaintiff effect than our 
speculation regarding the defendants’ advantage. 
Another approach would be to take a sampling of the appellate 
opinions (and the briefs and the records, and also the cases that did not 
reach appellate disposition or went unappealed altogether), and code for 
everything that one can think of (which turns out to be an extremely 
difficult and subjective enterprise). Then a new database would be 
available for restarting the analysis of plaintiff/defendant asymmetries. 
Such nondirected and in-depth research might be a worthwhile project. 
Whether the return would be commensurate with the effort is not certain, 
however. The first steps, taken in the course of this reply, do not suggest 
that some magical explanation will emerge to vaporize our concern about 
the antiplaintiff effect. 
In any event, we thought that our discovery of disparate impact on 
appeal was worthy of report, even though we could offer no complete 
explanation and even though the data naturally prompted a troubling 
speculation. We still do not believe that we acted irresponsibly—or that 
we were leveling a “highly inflammatory” charge.40 What we were doing 
was only social science, an approach that Judge Edwards appears not to 
apperceive.41 
As we have previously explained,42 we did not pursue this statistical 
research project to support a preconception. We certainly were not on the 
prowl for appellate bias, as we had reported previous results showing 
 
 
work and the reality of their output.”) (footnote omitted). 
 40. Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 734. 
 41. Medicine is another field that has long relied on intuition and so now deploys a derrière-
garde action against data. See Kevin Patterson, What Doctors Don’t Know (Almost Everything), N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 74, 76 (describing the contentious movement from Marcus 
Welby to so-called evidence-based medicine: “The point is that the conclusions doctors reach from 
clinical experience and day-to-day observation of patients are often not reliable.”). 
 42. See Defendant/Plaintiff III, supra note 6, at 102-03. 
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judicial neutrality.43 Instead, we were studying judge/jury differences 
when we happened to observe the plaintiff/defendant asymmetries on 
appeal. We were not happy to encounter an unexpected pattern that was 
both distracting and disquieting. We had to explore those asymmetries 
fully before speculating, which entailed constructing sophisticated models 
of not only the appellate court’s decision but also the party’s choice to 
appeal. We had no axe to grind, and there was no rush to judgment. 
Note that our bottom line was merely that “the data suggesting that 
appellate judges lean in favor of the defendant become a cause for 
concern.”44 Although we did speculate that bias was possible, we certainly 
were not saying that Judge Edwards and other appellate judges are 
consciously out to get plaintiffs in particular cases, but only that they may 
harbor unconscious biases that disparately impact plaintiffs in the long run 
of cases.45 We granted that this speculation was not air-tight, as we had no 
direct proof of appellate bias. 
So, what kinds of appellate judges’ attitudes were we supposing when 
we speculated? Perhaps appellate judges view plaintiffs’ appeals as 
tending to be weak because of incompetent counsel, while they view 
 
 
 43. See, e.g., Defendant/Plaintiff I, supra note 6, at 143 & n.36 (citing inter alia Orley 
Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of 
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995) (reporting results exactly of 
the kind that presumably would meet Judge Edwards’ approval: no evidence of judicial politics’ 
influencing outcome in the mass of cases)); supra note 17. One might think that a judge, who must 
constantly choose between arguments of interested parties, would be more receptive to research by 
those with no axe to grind. Such disinterested research seems especially important in light of 
continuing efforts by interested parties to fund research in the hope of shaping research results. See, 
e.g., Kevin A. Schulman et al., A National Survey of Provisions in Clinical-Trial Agreements Between 
Medical Schools and Industry Sponsors, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1335 (2002) (academic institutions 
routinely engage in industry-sponsored medical research that fails to comply with international 
guidelines regarding trial design, access to data, and publication rights); Elizabeth Warren, The Market 
for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 43 (“When 
data become a commodity—purchased, packaged, and sold to a willing public under a university 
imprimatur by those who profit from its distribution—then empirical work becomes little more than 
cheap ad copy.”). As an example of the trend, we need not resort to some tired offense such as tobacco 
research, but can cite a current book by leading academics critical of punitive damages, which they 
based on research funded by ExxonMobil Corporation after its predecessor corporation suffered an 
adverse punitive damages award. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE (2002). 
 44. Litigation Realities, supra note 5, at 153. In his personal “concluding note,” Judge Edwards 
rephrases our bottom line as “appellate judging is largely a lawless enterprise rather than a reflection 
of the legal merits of particular claims.” Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 734. 
 45. Moreover, in our appellate research we are not using disparate impact statistics to propose the 
imposition of civil liability for bias, but only to pursue the beneficial effects of sunshine on possibly 
worrisome behavior that is important and otherwise unreviewable. But cf. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 
1249, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“I am in complete agreement with the expressed view in the majority 
opinion indicating that a court can conclude that an unlawful disparate impact has been established [by 
statistics].”) (Edwards, J., concurring in a discrimination case by black DEA agents). 
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defendants’ appeals as tending to be strong because of frequent district 
court errors of law against defendants’ interests.46 In other words, we were 
supposing the kinds of attitudes to which Judge Edwards vehemently 
admitted in trying to explain our data. Therefore, by observing that he 
holds the kinds of biased principles that we hypothesized, we can take one 
small step toward meeting his demand that we “ascertain whether 
appellate judges actually hold the view that trial courts inappropriately 
favor plaintiffs.”47 He allows us now to supplement our dry data and 
indirect proof with an illustrative case in point that helps to explain the 
antiplaintiff effect. 
CONCLUSION 
In the article that originally attracted Judge Edwards’ ire, we 
parsimoniously concluded, “Data are good.”48 In closing here, we might 
observe, “Anecdote is not necessarily bad.” Judge Edwards has given us 
an anecdote in support of our research on appellate courts. 
 
 
 46. For more discussion of the kinds of attitudes hypothesized, see supra note 13 and text 
accompanying note 37. 
 47. Edwards & Elliott, supra note 7, at 732. 
 48. Litigation Realities, supra note 5, at 154. A recent book, JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, ONCE UPON A 
NUMBER 7-8 (1998), observed “that first, we tell stories, and then—in the blink of an eon—we cite 
statistics,” but the thrust of the book was that both data and anecdotes have proper roles to play. 
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